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On Being a
Republican

Notes of a Party
Chairman

in

Massachusetts

Andrew Natsios

In the 1970s the Democratic

and Republican national and state parties

initiated efforts at

party renewal in order to reverse their declining institutional power. Between 1980 and

1987 the Massachusetts Republican Party undertook a renewal

effort

modeled after

that

of the Republican National Committee under William Brock. This model emphasized the
provision to candidates and to the grassroots party organization of campaign sendees
such as literature design, polling, direct mail fund-raising, telephone banks, and cam-

paign schools. The Massachusetts Republican Party concentrated these services

to

candidates for the state legislature, achieving the largest net gain in seats since 1962.

Campaign technology as a party renewal strategy has inherent
have been reached; further progress may require changes

limits,

in the

which

may now

ideology and image of the

state party.

Certainly

one of the most significant trends

in the

American

political

system over the

past several decades has been the virtual collapse of American political parties as
institutions of governance,

which has produced several unanticipated consequences

that

have weakened the political system. The cost of campaigns has increased dramatically

at

both the state and national level as the media-intensive direct primary has replaced the
party nominating convention as the principal
office.

When they were

mechanism

for choosing candidates for

functional, parties served both as institutional

mechanisms

for

aggregating interest groups in American society so they could influence public policy and
as a screen to protect policymakers
tics.

from the corrupting influences of interest-group poliwith the attendant problems of

Now interest groups influence government directly,

influence peddling, the corrupting influence of their campaign contributions going directly to candidates,

and incoherent national policy as the interest groups encourage con-

gressional committees and executive branch agencies to

make

policy decisions even

if

those policies are contradictory from one agency or law to another.

The parties acted

as the

primary medium through which candidates and officeholders

communicated with the public, a

role the

mass media have taken

for themselves,

and for

Andrew Natsios, a member of the Massachusetts House of Representatives from 1975 to 1987 and chairman of the
Massachusetts Republican State Committee from 1980 to 1987, is director of the Office ofU. S. Foreign Disaster
Assistance, Agency for International Development, in the Bush administration.
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which they are

suited.

A

made

strong case could be

that declining voter participation,

greater public cynicism of political figures, and the instability of governing coalitions are
a function of the unsuitability of the

media

as a

mechanism

for this sort of

communication.

when they fail, democracy
The political parties, or what

important institutions in democracies;

Political parties are

is

weakened and the authority of government is diminished.
was left of them when their authority reached its lowest point in the late 1960s and 1970s,
began to consider measures to renew themselves. This article examines the efforts at
renewal in the Republican Party in Massachusetts between 1980 and 1986, the result of
those efforts, and the prospects for the party in the 1990 elections. As Massachusetts
Republican Party Chairman from 1980 to 1987, 1 directed this attempt at party renewal,
so

I

write as a practitioner.

History
Republicans in Massachusetts,

win
the

elections,

same time they began

torical
setts

who had long

to lose their hold

on

little to

do with

constant war within

its

power in the state because of hisDemocratic Party in Massachuwhich was weak, ineffective, and at

rise of the

formal party structure,

The Democrats more resembled
but they nevertheless began to win

itself.

than an organized party,

to

their party decline institutionally at

political

changes beyond the party's control. The

had

on the formal party organization

relied

had the singular misfortune of having

a mosaic of feudal fiefdoms
elections beginning in the late

1940s, finally, under Michael Dukakis, taking complete control of state government in the

mid-1970s. Because the structure of the Republican Party was central to
cesses in the era

when

catastrophic to

than any organizational weakness the Democrats

it

it

was

in

its

electoral suc-

power, the decline of the party institutionally was more

may have

suffered as

both parties declined institutionally.

For nearly eighty years, from the Civil War

until 1948,

Massachusetts was a bastion of

Yankee Republicanism. For most of this time the Republican Party held majorities

in

both

houses of the legislature and elected both U.S. senators and the majority of the congressional delegation.

The Democrats succeeded, beginning

lace-curtain Irishman

from outside Boston,

like

win the gover-

in the 1930s, to

norship with greater frequency and occasionally a U.S. Senate seat

David Walsh,

to

when

they nominated a

run for that office. These

exceptions proved the rule of Republican predominance.
In the nineteenth century the Republicans' control reflected

simple demographic truth that
the immigrant Irish.

1

more than anything

swamp and Brahmin Yankees were more numerous

By 1920 two

thirds of the population of the state

the children of immigrants, and the Yankees could no longer count
ity to

win

2

elections. In

to a

than

was foreign born or

on numerical superior-

1924 the party reached a turning point when control over the

organization, in a celebrated and bitter struggle, passed from the elder

Lodge

the

new generation of Yankee

state

Henry Cabot

politicians led by Calvin Coolidge.

3

Republican

Party leaders sought to stem the tide of growing immigrant power reflected in the resur-

gent Democratic Party through several strategies after their poor showing in 1928-1932.
First, they centralized political

made

it

into

power

in the party in the

an effective political organization designed

Republican State Committee and
to protect the existing arrange-

ment of power in the state. Second, they systematically attempted to assimilate some of the
newer immigrant groups (French, Italians, Jews, and Poles) into the party, a task made
easier by the refusal of the Irish,

who

increasingly dominated the Democratic Party, to

allow any measure of participation by Catholics from eastern and southern Europe,

36

blacks, or Jews. Finally, the party espoused moderate social and

economic reform

to

4
appeal to disadvantaged ethnic groups.

The Democrats

did their part to

make

the Republican strategy succeed by inept and

The Democrats should have taken

parochial leadership and brutal factional infighting.

over the state just after World

War

I,

as

demographic changes moved rapidly

in their favor.

Instead, not until 1954 did the Republican Party finally lose control of the state

House of

Representatives, and 1958 of the state Senate. Republican candidates continued to win the

governorship frequently

1974, when Francis Sargent was
when Edward Brooke lost.

until

U.S. Senate seat until 1978,

defeated, and at least one

The Republican Party organization was an extraordinary edifice to behold in the earlier
years. Each town had an elected committee of between twenty and thirty-five members,
with ward committees in the cities serving a parallel function. The work of the committee
was carefully planned and organized by an extensive
Republican State Committee

files fund-raising

state party staff.

manuals designed

We

found

for 1936,

in

old

which would

5
be regarded as state-of-the-art fund-raising by present-day standards. Each town commit-

tee

had a quota

to raise

by knocking on the doors of every Republican

in

town once a

year.

The proceeds were sent to the state committee. I can recall this system in practice in the
1960s in my hometown, Holliston, where I, a teenager, was assigned a route to complete.
The Republican town committees, until the 1960s, ran the campaigns of Republican candidates

from president

to state representative.

Patronage from Republican governors was

distributed through and by the local party organization until John Volpe, realizing that the

own base by distributing patronage
who had supported him for governor.

base of the party was declining, sought to expand his
outside the party to Democrats and independents

Republican Party platforms prior to the 1960s were serious documents that successful
candidates were expected to implement after the election. Party workers aspired to the

chairmanship of a town or ward committee, which was a sought-after position.

From 1953

to

delegates to these conclaves were chosen by the town and
gates

in nomThe Republican

1974 the local Republican Party organization played a major role

inating candidates for statewide office at state nominating conventions.

were almost always members of the

ward committees, and

the dele-

local committees. Well into the late 1970s, the

—

UN the Yankees had gradually agreed
power with ethnic Republicans and the party's ticket reflected this changed constituency. With few exceptions, those who were nominated at the Republican state conventions were also successful in the statewide primaries in September of each election year.
The Democrats were less successful at keeping up party discipline after these conven-

party's slate of candidates resembled a domestic
to share

tions, so that

bitterness
office.

many convention

choices were defeated in the Democratic primaries. The

and factionalism of the fights contributed

to the

Democratic losses

A Democratic legislature abolished these conventions in

for statewide

1973. Only recently have

they been revived by the Democrats.
In a word, the old Republican organizational structure

had

critical tasks to

perform:

candidate selection, campaign organization, fund-raising, patronage distribution, and

platform writing.

The increasing mobility of American

society

made

it

more

difficult to maintain a stable

Republican Party structure, since new residents require socialization in a community
before they get involved in politics.

The dramatic increase

in the

number of working

women meant that one of the major sources of Republican volunteer help, women, would
be occupied with their own careers rather than working in political campaigns. The Massachusetts Federation of Republican Women, which once had chapters in almost every
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city

and large town,

is

now reduced

to fourteen chapters of twelve

hundred older women

(with the exception of the Boston club and a few suburban clubs that younger

women

join).

These

historic trends coincided, in 1969, with local political events that accelerated the

collapse of the old Massachusetts Republican Party apparatus. Early that year Governor

John Volpe became secretary of transportation

who had had

Sargent, a patrician Yankee

Nixon administration. Frank

in the

a distinguished career in state service before

being elected lieutenant governor in 1966, ascended to the governor's chair. Sargent and

Republican Party

his advisers, in assessing the declining fortunes of the

wealth, decided the local party organization was

more

trouble than

quently put distance between the governor's office and the party.
dislike as Sargent appointed

more and more Democrats

presumably

more

to co-opt

The

in the

common-

was help and consedistance

grew to
and

to his staff, to judgeships,

the state bureaucracy. After his election in 1970 the governor
left ideologically,

it

began a gradual move

to

to the

any Democratic candidate for governor from

were the party conservafrom the Sargent administration, but
so were the business community and the moderate wing of the party. By the early 1970s
the Republican Party was engaged in a destructive civil war.
While the party had been in genteel decay for two decades as a result of inexorable
attacking from a
tives, a

growing force

changes

in the state,

it

liberal platform. In the process not only

in the organization, alienated

was the Sargent administration

that

rendered the final blow to the

creaking organization. Sargent maintained control of the state committee through his

hand-picked state chairmen, each of whom served brief but destructive terms between

1969 and 1972 and

left the

party in shambles.

The

collapse of the fund-raising capacity

of the state committee took income from $495,000 in 1968 to $50,000 in 1972 with a

$90,000 debt. The once powerful
party worker

was

laid off.

who had been

staff

was reduced

to

one secretary, Peg Kelly, a career

with the state committee for twenty-five years; everyone else

The number of Republican town and ward committee members declined
in 1968 to seven thousand in 1972. The statistics only confirmed

from fourteen thousand
what was happening

to the party at the state level.

6

One of Sargent's party chairmen told me that he was given orders by the governor to
down the fund-raising operation of the state party because it was competing with his
own fund-raising. As a Sargent loyalist, the chairman obediently carried out the instruction. One of Sargent's senior staff advisers told me the crux of the governor's motivation
shut

for rendering the final

blow

to the party

:

he feared

for conservative opposition to his administration

it

would become an organizing center

and more particularly

to his reelection

campaign. His fear was shortly confirmed.

The conservative wing assessed the damage to the party and began an effort to wrest
from Sargent in the spring of 1972. The anti-Sargent slate
won across the state. The new state committee elected as its chairman Otto Wahlrab, a

control of the state committee

who with the help of Ann Witherbee, a moderate Republican and
new finance chairman, spent his time restoring morale among what remained

local party organizer,

the party's

of the party workers and paying off the party debt.

The conservative insurgency

in the party led to a

formal challenge to Sargent in the

1974 gubernatorial election by Carroll Sheehan, a strong conservative and former
ber of the Sargent administration

who had become disgusted by

While the challenge was unsuccessful (36 percent

for

mem-

Sargent's liberalism.

Sheehan, 64 percent for Sargent),

it

did focus opposition to the administration. In the general election, Sargent was defeated

by Michael Dukakis, a Democrat

who

ran on a conservative no-new-taxes platform. Exit
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polls indicated that Sargent received only

55 percent of the Republican vote

in

the general

election, with

Dukakis receiving 45 percent. Sargent took 44 percent and Dukakis 56

percent of the

total

two-party vote for governor.

While the declining fortunes of the Republican Party
by Sargent's defeat

GOP than any party

in

Massachusetts were confirmed

more ominous for the
marked a critical turning

1974, the victory of Michael Dukakis was

in

leader then realized. Dukakis's election

point for the Democratic as well as the Republican Party. In one election he engineered
three critical changes in the image of his party: he had wrested control from the Irish,

who had

controlled

fortunes since the 1920s; he had increased the base of the party by

its

capturing the loyalty of the white-collar, professional, and technocratic managerial class,

which though independent had frequently voted Republican
Democratic Party the primary conduit for the reform
torate.

and he made the

Massachusetts elec-

Before 1974 the Republican Party was the only party that "respectable'* people

interested in
as an

for governor;

instinct in the

good government could

in

conscience vote

for; the

Democratic Party's image

urban party of followers of James Michael Curley had made

it

an inhospitable place

government reform.

for those interested in

Immediately following the election, an emergency meeting of the State Republican

Committee was held

censure and remove the chairman,

to

Bill

Barnstead. Wahlrab's

conservative successor. Barnstead had announced publicly in the middle of the gubernatorial

campaign

that

he could not vote for Sargent, an act of disloyalty that could not be

tolerated by even the conservatives

on the committee, who joined the ouster move.

special search committee, under the direction of the

statewide office, Senator

A

one remaining Republican holding

Edward Brooke, chose John Winthrop

Sears, a patrician's patri-

A direct lineal descendant of the first governor of the state,

Sears had held office as
County sheriff, and commissioner, under Sargent, of the Metropolitan District Commission. (Sears later became the
first Republican in decades to be elected to the Boston City Council.) Sears, a Harvard

cian.

a state representative

from Beacon

Hill in Boston, Suffolk

new effort to
Gordon Nelson. Nelson had founded

graduate and Rhodes Scholar, was to hold office for only a year because a
control the state committee was being undertaken by

a group called

REGRO,

Republicans for a Grassroots Organization, which was simply a

cover for Nelson's ambitions to be state committee chairman. Sears realized what was

happening too
ity that,

man

late,

and Nelson's

slate of candidates for state

committee won a bare plural-

with one of the other factions on the committee, was sufficient to elect him chair-

in the spring of 1976.

(The

man he

defeated by one vote,

Andrew Card, now

serves

as deputy chief of staff to President Bush.)

Gordon Nelson,

the

man I removed as chairman four years later, was a unique character
who had begun as a campaign worker for Barry Goldwater in

in the party organization

1964.

A Harvard graduate and a commodities broker by profession.

Jew

be elected chairman of the Republican Party

to

in

Nelson was the

Massachusetts.

first

He possessed an

extraordinary amount of raw energy, a bright but exceedingly rigid mind, and a powerful
personality that
conservative, a

some found overbearing and

abrasive. Nelson styled himself a

member of a national network of zealous

to the establishment of a conservative party in the

Republican Party

— or outside,

if

movement

conservative ideologues devoted

United States within the structure of the

necessary.

When Nelson began his term as chairman,

state Repubwould go on to win elections by
virtue of its ideology. The strategy for this conversion was to be an alliance with conservative, ethnic Democrats, who, he thought, would feel more at home in a conservative Re-

he believed he could fashion the

lican Party into an exclusively conservative party that
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publican Party than a liberal Democratic one. Nelson set about rebuilding the party with

what he called Project Precinct, a door-to-door

effort by the existing party structure in

each city and town to recruit new workers to the local committees. The idea was neither
novel nor unreasonable. Other states with strong party organizations regularly conducted

much

same

the

sort of drive.

accomplished a similar end

Decades

in its

earlier, the

Republican Party

unmitigated disaster in that virtually no one participated.
tual flaw: the

in

Massachusetts had

door-to-door fund-raising efforts. The project was an

Republican organization across the

state

It

contained one major concep-

had become so weak

that

was

it

One cannot

incapable in most areas, and unwilling in the rest, of knocking on any doors.

from nothing with nonexistent workers. When the Republican generals
one reported for duty. Time, along with the continuing
ideological war in the party and the neglect of Republican officeholders who should have
known better, had done its work on the grassroots organization.
After some effort Nelson gave up trying to reconstruct the Massachusetts party and
rebuild something

called their troops to battle, no

concentrated on presidential politics from a decidedly conservative perspective. Massa-

which had a large bloc of delegates

chusetts,

to the national

conventions every four years,

could be important in nominating a conservative presidential candidate. Thus, he became
involved in Ronald Reagan's campaign for president in 1976 and Philip Crane's presiden-

campaign in 1980. (Nelson reportedly had made a deal with Crane that he would
become chairman of the Republican National Committee if Crane were elected president.) He became one of William Brock's (RNC chairman 1977-1980) most tenacious
adversaries with his band of movement conservatives on the RNC from other areas of the
country. Where Brock emphasized technological innovation for the national party, Nelson
tial

called for an ideological crusade.

While these events unfolded

in

Massachusetts, a quiet revolution was under way

Republican National Committee in which
traordinary effort at party renewal.

Bill

at the

Brock, the party chairman, began an ex-

He reasoned that American political parties were in

many scholars had been arguing. A new party system taking
shape would add a critical new role in the political system for parties.
Political parties had become largely irrelevant to modern American politics, their pri-

transition, not in decline, as

mary functions being

shifted to other institutions. Brock's innovations at the national

He trans-

Republican Party were consistent with the changing technology of politics.

formed the Republican National Committee
organization.

Modern campaigns employed

in the pursuit of victory:

tional

was

all

all

computerized voting

phisticated polling, telephone banks

gathered

into a candidate

and

state party service

the newest technologies of the

lists,

modern

era

radio and television advertising, so-

and campaign consultants and direct mail.

Bill

Brock

these technologies and services under the umbrella of the Republican Na-

Committee, so

that

when

a Republican candidate needed help, an array of resources

available.

RNC donor base increased from 500,000 to
RNC gross income grew from $10 million to $40 million,

During the Brock era the
tributors,

and

Brock used

to

provide a broad set of campaign and political services. 7

1

.5

million con-

money that
The national com-

mittee was transformed from a federation of fifty very independent state party organizations into a

major corporation with

fifty state subsidiaries.

characteristics of a large corporation, chief of which

is

The

RNC displays most of the

a trained cadre of technicians and

managers producing services for their customers, in this case candidates and state parties.
The salesmen in this political corporation, the field staff, serviced the state parties, candidates,

and Republican campaign operatives. The 150 members of the
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RNC

itself,

three

from each

had become more a corporate board of directors than the collection of

state,

from each

political leaders

state

it

had once been. Under Brock's reforms the

state party

chairmen became automatic voting members of the RNC.

The United
two

in

each

most of

States for

state

its

history has not had two national political parties but

— separate, independent, and autonomous from their national counter-

parts in Washington. This rather feudal organization

was reflected

in the

dependent status

of national party on the state parties for financial support. During the 1930s and earlier,

Committee was dependent for a portion of its income from the
8
apparatus. Power and money are inextricably interwoven
in politics, and a national party financially dependent on the states was weak indeed.
That relationship has exactly reversed itself on the Republican side since the new party
system reached its full force during the 1980s. Now the Republican National Committee
makes grants to the state parties to fund their operations, with inevitable strings being
attached on how the money is to be spent. These strings, just as in federal grant-in-aid
the Republican National

fifty state parties' fund-raising

programs, have had a centralizing and standardizing influence on the

state parties.

One

power of these grants: in 1984 one of the major programmatic undertakings of the RNC was the computerization of the voting lists of the fifty states, for which it
and the Republican senatorial committee made sizable grants to state parties to accomplish. The very existence of these computerized lists at the state level caused the nature of
campaigns to change, with greater emphasis on direct mail, telephone banks, and comillustration of the

puter systems,

all tied to

state parties to

develop

the computerized voting

lists.

The

RNC grants drove many of the

this political technology.

While the renewal of the Republican National Party took a technological and campaignoriented direction, the Democratic National Committee undertook what
the

McGovern reforms, which profoundly

Polsby, in

is

now known

as

altered the structure of their party. Nelson

Consequences of Party Reform? argues

that the

Democratic effort

at party

renewal

may have

but

equally clear that the reforms were centralizing in their effect as the rules for the

it

is

accelerated the decline of the party as a force in presidential politics,

selection of delegates to the
state

Democratic National Committee forced changes

Democratic committees ran

national level

became models

for

The Brock revolution renewed
Brock's new party system, the
politics,

their business.

in the

way

Both these courses of party renewal

at the

reforming the two political parties in Massachusetts.
the prospects for political parties in America.

Under

RNC added a critically important dimension to its role in

becoming a provider of the resources Republican candidates needed

to

run their

individual campaigns. Instead of a volunteer-based staff and national party structure, the

new system substituted full-time paid professional campaign operatives to organize the
work that had to be done to win elections. The new system was much more centralized
and complex. The RNC was now more powerful politically than ever before, albeit under
a new mandate and different ground rules. The RNC has since served as a role model for
the Democrats,

mation

ment

who thus

in their party. I

that

we adopted

thus established

far

have been unsuccessful in accomplishing the same transfor-

found the Brock model so compelling a direction

it

for the Massachusetts

in party develop-

Republican Party. The direction for us was

— remake the Massachusetts State Committee into a candidate service

organization providing a set of carefully defined services to Republican candidates for
office in Massachusetts.

We would do polling,

write campaign literature, design newspa-

per advertisements, draft campaign plans, set up phone banks, consult on campaign man-

agement, train managers in our campaign schools, and raise and distribute money to
candidates.
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The Republican
Our

State Strategy

attention because

More

level.

We chose that body as the

a party to

it

offered

some wonderful opportunities

needed

to

subject of our

for party building at the local

than any other elected officials, Republican legislators had a vested interest in

work on

their reelection

campaigns. Legislators' reelection frequently became

They nurtured each

the reason for existence of local party committees.

The

on services

strategy for reconstructing the Republican State Party concentrated

candidates for the Massachusetts legislature.

to get reelected

legislator

was the

legislative races

might be recruited for local committees

campaigns became mechanisms

to exclusively candidate, workers.

emphasized professional

More

to perform.

Campaign workers

visible evidence of their success in politics.

from successful and unsuccessful
after the election; the

other: legislators

and party committees needed work of significance

new

for enlisting

party, as

opposed

than congressional or statewide races, which

staff to the detriment of volunteers, legislative races tended to

be

the exclusive preserve of the volunteer.

The campaign organizations of Republican
party organizations, even
local committees.

if

legislators

became, over time, the local

the workers never formally associated themselves with the

Incumbent

legislators

dates of their choice for higher office.

would use

While

all

their

own workers

the workers

to

support candi-

were not automatically

trans-

ferable to other candidates, because of differences in personal preferences between
legislators

and

their workers, the natural inclination of anyone, including legislators, is to

support those candidates for higher office with

whom they

agree on the issues,

values and lifestyles. So workers supporting a conservative

make

could

minimal

Democrat

who

share

for the legislature

the conversion to a conservative Democratic candidate for governor with

difficulty. Legislative races are

one of the

least studied yet

most significant meth-

ods of political socialization for activists in our political system.
If the

Republican Party was to be built

locally,

it

would be through the

local leadership

of Republican legislators and candidates for the legislature. If we were ever going to win
statewide and national races,
first.

Every candidate tends

we would have

to

win

to bring into his or her

local offices, such as legislative seats,

campaign

relatives, friends,

and

neighbors as workers, and the campaign becomes a magnet for drawing uninvolved peo-

The most efficient way we could rebuild the party organization at the
more and better campaigns for every office. Campaigns are a
graduate school in political leadership and an employment agency for skilled operatives.
They direct the best and brightest to party -building after the election.
For nearly a century the farm team system was the method the Republican Party used to

ple into politics.

grassroots level was to run

govern Massachusetts. If you wanted to be governor or U.S. senator, you
for

town or

politics
trol

city office, then the state legislature, serve a

and government, and then consider higher

first

had

to

run

few terms

to learn the business of

When

Democrats took con-

office.

the

of the state political system, they adopted, perhaps unconsciously, the same system of

recruitment.
crats

As of the 1984

election, every

congressman

in

Massachusetts (ten

and one Republican), save one (Gerry Studds), had served

city office before
state legislators,

There

is

running for Congress.

in

1978 were former

and half of the Massachusetts legislature former town or

good reason

you learn how

Two thirds of Congress

Demo-

in the state legislature or

city officials.

when you run for lower office
press, how to raise money and orga-

for this characteristic of the system:

to give a speech,

how

to deal with the

nize a campaign, what the issues are, and what politics in general

is all

about.

When

Re-

publicans run for a high office in Massachusetts, never having held a lower office, they
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spend the
the

half of their

first

campaign learning what they are supposed

Democrats are racing ahead. The novice

in politics, as in

to

be doing, while

any profession, makes more

mistakes of greater seriousness and consequence than the skilled and experienced officeholder.

To win higher offices we had

to elect

more Republican

legislators

who would

provide the pool of successful candidates for higher office as they matured into seasoned
politicians.

We chose to concentrate on

the legislative races for practical political reasons.

the limited resources of the state committee,

we could more effectively

race for the legislature than a large race for statewide office.

We

Given

influence a small

could not hope to elect

through our efforts a governor or U.S. senator given the scope, cost, and complexity of

we

those campaigns, but

could be the decisive force in a legislative race. The modern

technology of politics had only sporadically been applied by Democrats to legislative
races. If

we could apply those technologies consistently to a carefully chosen set of tarwe might prevail. We defined success simply and clearly: electing more

geted races,

Republicans to the legislature.
Legislative races permitted us to focus voter attention on state rather than the national
issues
setts

on which we might be vulnerable in the state. Since the Democrats ran Massachuto bottom, they had to accept complete responsibility for public outrage

from top

over high taxes

incompetence

— the chief state issue according to opinion polls — and any scandals and

in state

government.

In these local races the issues

were of somewhat limited value

in

winning elections

in

any case; the character of the candidate and quality of the campaign were of primary importance.

over

The

who the

legislative races,

more than any

didate of the right background) and

While

other type, allowed us a measure of control

candidates were (we could match the demographics of a district with a can-

this strategy

may seen

how they campaigned (most knew

the self-evident choice,

another school of thought in the Republican Party.

it

Many

little

about politics).

encountered opposition from
believed that

the lower offices and recruit for governor a charismatic leader

we ought

who would

to ignore

lead us to vic-

on Election Day. The theory proposed that we needed an attractive figure who could
draw new workers and voters into the party by stature, powerful style, and magnetic personality. The problem was not only where to find this prophetic leader but to find one
tory

who would be more
ing.

Would

this loyal

interested in building the party than his or her

own

personal follow-

following be permanently transferable to the party's structure, espe-

cially since the figure's

presumed

attractiveness to the workers

was based more on

cult of

personality than on philosophic conviction? Charismatic figures tend not to have the stay-

power or permanence needed to construct a stable and permanent institution like a
The central problem of the Democratic Party in 1990 is the impending
departure of the man around whom the new party in Massachusetts has been organized.
ing

political party.

Michael Dukakis; while not charismatic, he had been enormously powerful

and controlling

in building

power has dissipated significantly since his poll ratings
collapsed and he announced that he would not seek reelection.
The argument could certainly be made that the average voter, who is somewhat oblivihis party.

But

ous to the subtleties of party

this

politics,

could more easily focus attention on a strong per-

sonality than a set of ideas a political party stood for or the institution of the party itself.
resisted this

became

I

view of party rebuilding for the duration of my chairmanship, but the theory

reality without

formal adoption by the party organization.

No political leader in

Massachusetts could have galvanized the state electorate to break ranks with their normal,
independent, and Democratic status to ally themselves with the Republican Party the way
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Ronald Reagan

did.

He became our charismatic

leader without any conscious strategy on

we needed to draw
when Reagan took eighteen of the thirty-nine

our part. His role as the head of the national party was the linchpin
voters to the party, as happened in 1984,
cities in

Few

Massachusetts.

of the causes of the Republican Party's present condition in Massachusetts could be

dramatically changed by the effort of the state party save one: the campaigns Republican

candidates run for office. Except for those few cases in which

Republican campaigns

They were

in

we won

came

or

close,

Massachusetts resembled coming-out parties for debutantes.

polite affairs at

which everyone worried about organizational

charts,

no one

took winning too seriously, and no one perspired too much. Republican campaigns were
rooted in the past, in an era

when politics was

a citizen's duty and candidates stood rather

than ran for public office. Excessive ambition was regarded as dangerous and unseemly in
a candidate, so campaigns were appropriately restrained in time, expense, and size. Politics

changed

in

Massachusetts, but the Republican view of campaigns and public office

never did.

Our candidates

for the legislature

were generally better qualified than

their

Democratic

opponents, but they lost nevertheless. Republicans regularly raised and spent less money,

knocked on fewer,

if any,

doors, recruited fewer volunteers, lacked trained and experi-

enced campaign managers and

staff,

wrote long, complex, and

intellectual tracts of cam-

paign literature no one read, did virtually no direct mail, and never conceived of using

computers

The

in a

campaign. So they

personality, character,

lost,

badly and regularly.

and motivation of Republican candidates

differed sharply from those of the Democrats. Republicans were

more

in

Massachusetts

reserved,

shy and aloof than their opponents; they marched in parades reluctantly,

if at all,

more
seldom

waded into a crowd to shake hands, and avoided glad-handing and backslapping. They
were hesitant candidates, motivated by duty rather than any strong ambition or the need
for a relatively well-paying job in the public sector. Idealism and public spirit were noble
sentiments for public officials to possess, but they count for

little,

unfortunately, in getting

people elected to office. Someone in Massachusetts politics once suggested that Republicans were excellent at governing, but terrible at politics, while the Democrats were just
the opposite.

So while Massachusetts Republicans governed well, they seldom, more

recently at least, had the opportunity to use their skills.

The Candidate Service Bureau

RNC model remained the central work of the MassaCommittee for the time I served as chairman. All other tasks
performed by the party were either incidental or supplemental to our effort to elect more
Republicans to the Massachusetts legislature. Attempts to improve the voters' image of
the party, develop a new program to govern Massachusetts, programs to rebuild the grassroots party structure and raise a great deal more money for party coffers, all contributed
Providing candidate services on the

chusetts Republican State

to but

The

one end

— the election of Republicans to legislative office.

first judgment

we made

in the operation of the service

and resources would be generally available

to all candidates

bureau was which services

and which specifically re-

we had the best chance of victory. We concentrated
more winnable campaigns.
Republican candidates for office would have access to party services we could pro-

served for those campaigns in which
the bulk of our resources in these

All

vide in unlimited volume without increasing staff time or cost. These included campaign
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name

schools, access to the voter

files

(computer

of registered voters), research on

lists

incumbents' voting records, issue seminars and briefing papers, manuals on campaign

management, sample campaign literature, simple field staff advice on technical questions
(e.g., where and when to file campaign finance disclosure forms), and issue and campaign newsletters. Information was inexpensive and therefore available to every Republican candidate

who

requested

it.

Reserved for targeted races were direct financial

campaign plans, survey and polling

contributions, literature production,

field staff help, get-out-the-vote telephone

data, intensive

bank assistance, and direct mail packages.

These were obviously the more labor-intensive and expensive services most

make the difference between victory and defeat.
The most difficult task was not deciding the services
untargeted races, but which races
criteria to

fell

into

to

be provided

which category.

likely to

to targeted

We developed

and

four general

judge which races were winnable: vacant legislative seats, favorable demo-

graphics and past voting behavior of the
paign. Vacant seats,

all

incumbent

seats unless the

district,

a candidate of quality, and a strong cam-

other factors being equal, are
is

was hopelessly Democratic

much

easier to

win than occupied

under indictment or accused of child abuse. Unless a

in

demographic and voting patterns,

cent candidates were targeted as a first priority.

which no Republican candidate

for any office

all

We deemed unwinnable those

had won

district

vacant seat with dedistricts in

in the past ten years, or those in

which the demographic characteristics were not favorable

to a

Republican candidate.

Conversely, middle-class districts in which serious Republican candidates for whatever
office regularly

endum
ogy

won were placed at the top of the targeted list. The popular vote on referNovember ballots that indicated an economically conservative ideol-

questions on

example, establishment of a graduated income tax and Proposition 2Vi, a

(for

property tax limitation measure) were also used as

After

all

measures

statistical

for targeting.

these factors were mathematically built into a computer model, with weights

assigned to each characteristic, each district was rated from the most to the least winnable.

We hired a pollster to produce this model with analysis of each district in the

state

in 1981.

Once

the districts

were analyzed, we looked

at the personalities

of the Democratic and

Republican candidates and their respective campaigns. If the incumbent Democrat was
invisible in his district,

had a poor reputation

the ideology of his district, so that the district

data from the computer ranking),

we placed

for constituent

work, voted regularly against

was considered winnable (on the basis of

the race

on the targeted

list.

Our

analysis of

each race included a careful distinction between the quality of the campaign and the candidate.

We had many
were

articulate

excellent candidates by training, reputation, character,

and presentable, but

didates of good character

made

for

campaign

style, yet

if

we

integrity.

This

latter characteristic I

proficient

campaign

to

we

in a

candidate are an

deemed important because

elected rogues to office, our small remaining base in the state

Early in the campaign

can-

ran technically proficient

campaigns. The two principal personal characteristics we search for

win and

Some

a mediocre impression, because of inability to speak in

public, personal shyness, or aloofness in

intense desire to

and education who

whatever reason ran poor campaigns.

would

fast erode.

explained to each candidate the definition of a tehnically

which

their

campaigns had

to

conform

in

order to be considered

campaign manager (candidates shouldn't run
their own campaigns); (2) a threshold level of funds to be raised by the campaign ($5,000
for the House, $15,000 for the Senate); (3) a written campaign plan that was being implefor targeting.

Requirements included

(1) a
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merited (as opposed to being strictly on paper); (4) attendance by manager and candidate
at a

campaign school; and

door

(5) in

House

races, the candidate's agreement to

Using these

and candidates were ranked

criteria, the districts

winners, marginal seats, and unlikely or hopeless races.

who

knock on each

in the district.

then determined the

mix of services and

in three categories: likely

We hired campaign field workers

direct financial help each of the likely win-

ners needed. Given the wide differences in campaign quality and resources, each

Some races needed

services was different.

had

limitless

money

mix of

nothing but large amounts of money; others

but poor campaign literature. For those presentable candidates whose

campaigns were generally well directed but whose judgment on spending money we ques-

money from our treasury for them. In lieu of a direct conwe would produce and place a newspaper or radio advertisement, write and print
brochure, or do a direct mail piece. In 1984 we wrote, laid out, and printed 500,000

tioned, our field staff spent the
tribution
a

campaign tabloids

for legislative candidates.

We

thus ensured that campaign weaknesses

were remedied without argument or extensive explanation, since most candidates were
happy

to accept

any help from us.

We concentrated not only
geted districts. While

it

resources but also our candidate recruitment efforts in tar-

was certainly desirable

to

have Republican candidates for every

more important that winnable seats be sought by good candidates.
In early 1981 we developed our first campaign school (one night a week for ten weeks)
for potential candidates and their managers. The party suffered from an absence of
trained and seasoned Massachusetts Republican operatives to run campaigns. The state
committee had not run real campaign schools for more than fifteen years; the Republican
leadership in the House had held some classes, but they turned out to be war story
seminars. Thomas Jefferson would lose a race for the legislature if incompetent managers
were running his campaign, while an average candidate could win with hard work and
seat,

it

was

far

skilled operatives directing the effort.

The schools covered

polling and survey research,

campaign

literature design, election

laws, personal campaigning by the candidate, identifying voter support, getting out sup-

porters on Election Day, fund-raising, advertising, media relations, overall strategy and
the use of issues,

how

to research

an incumbent's record, direct mail, and targeting by

precinct and demographic groups.
as supplemental reading;

As

it

We also issued a manual that covered all these

remains

in

a follow-up to the school, each election year

and managers

that outlined

which we reviewed recent
beginning to

come

ally to critique

we produced

a newsletter for candidates

what a campaign should be accomplishing

phases. Later in the election year

we

As

in

each of its

held schools for targeted race personnel only, in

state polling data

into focus.

subjects

use by the state party today.

a group,

and developed campaign themes

we reviewed each

them and share experiences

to

were

that

of the campaigns individu-

bring perspective to the candidates

who

were, without doubt, simultaneously in advanced states of shock and exhilaration. Sharing
the fears

common to

attention

on the important goals

One

each of them helped relieve the candidates' anxiety and focused

of the weaknesses of the

to

be accomplished before Election Day.

Campaign Service Bureau, which we remedied

in

1986,

was incumbent research. Most candidates, no matter how well instructed, seldom found
the time or developed the expertise to analyze thoroughly their opponents' record. For the
1986 election we constructed a

file

on each incumbent Democrat with

judged by a variety of special-interest groups (which rated them),

their voting records

their opponents' per-

sonal financial disclosure forms (required by state law), attendance at legislative sessions,
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roll call votes

on a broad spectrum of issues,

their

campaign finance reports from preced-

made on the floor of the legislature (recorded by televiof the House were televised). We had to leave it to candidates

ing elections, and any statements

sion cameras

—

all

to research their

sessions

opponents' local press statements and any contradictions between them

and their voting records.

A hard

look

dictory votes and statements which,
In 1982

we had one Democratic

rectly contradict himself

voting records usually yielded a supply of contra-

at

if

cleverly advertised, could unseat an incumbent.

candidate for state representative

from one speech

to

group he was addressing, so we wrote an attack brochure
documenting these convenient changes

in

in

an open seat

di-

another on major issues, depending on the
for our Republican candidate,

conscience by date and location. This became

the central issue of the campaign.

Former Congress woman Margaret Heckler,

in

one of her races

for

Congress, found

through careful incumbent research that her Democratic opponent had never before registered to vote, while claiming to have been an active party Democrat. She chose the right

time and place during a debate, with

all

the

media watching,

to

announce her

interesting

discovery.
In the

1980-1984 election cycles we came

to

some conclusions about

the relation be-

tween campaign spending and victory. While a big budget did not guarantee election, we
found a striking correlation between spending and winning. Republican candidates were
regularly outspent by their Democratic opponents, partly because 80 percent of the seats
in the legislature

were held by Democrats, and incumbents can

easily than challengers.

bents raise
lican

enormous amounts of money

incumbents seldom engage

chests

when opposition

seats prior to

for their

in similar tactics

their

campaigns

money much more
Repubwar

in nonelection years.

and must therefore build

Even given

actually appears.

cumbents usually outraised

open

raise

To discourage any challengers of either party, Democratic incumtheir

this disparity in behavior,

our

in-

Democratic challengers by virtue of their incumbency. In

1984 Democratic candidates outspent our candidates by sizable

ratios.

This was because the Democratic Party had trained an army of grassroots Democrats to
give

money

in political

campaigns; once indoctrinated, these givers contributed

Democratic campaigns. Our donor base, which had been strong
rated through disuse.
lost the habit

in the 1960s,

to

many

had deterio-

Fewer campaigns meant fewer requests for donations, so our donors
new ones were not recruited to replace those who died, moved,

of giving and

or tired of politics.
In legislative races, establishing

name

recognition for the candidate

is

the greater part

of the campaign work. Issues are of small consequence in low-visibility campaigns, so

spending money to increase a candidate's
ing a candidate's visibility requires
literature.

Money

is

name recognition is critical to victory. Improvmoney for direct mail, advertising, and campaign

indispensable to victory.

Providing campaign services required more

money and

a larger staff for the state party.

Income from fund-raising rose from $203,000 in 1979 to $910,000 in 1986, primarily
attributable to an increase in small donations from people approached through in-house
direct mail and telephone banks we created in 1983. The number of donors increased
from 6,000 in 1979 to 35,000 in 1986. The staff level at party headquarters stood at three
in the spring of 1980 and increased to twelve by 1986 (we reduced the staff after each
election from twelve to seven or eight, expanding the staff in the spring of each election
year).

We concentrated more money in our targeted races in each election between 1980 and
We first did this systematically in the 1984 campaigns, giving targeted candidates

1986.
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$2,500

in direct contributions

and $1 ,000

in services. In the

1986 election cycle

that

com-

we formed for the 1984 election cycle a
quiet working group of Republican and business PACs interested in changing the complexion of the legislature. There were two conservative taxpayer PACs and two Republican
PACs, one of the House Republican Committee and the other a moderate Republican PAC
chaired by Elliott Richardson. The Friday Group, as we called it, met twice a month to
discuss the races. We did not always agree on whom we would help. The conservative
PACs also helped conservative Democrats, while the Republican groups never did. The
state party made no ideological distinctions, while the Richardson PAC tended to give to
more moderate candidates. The importance of the group was that it reached enough conbined figure was increased to $7,500. In addition,

sensus that most targeted candidates received an additional $3,000 to $4,000 over what
the state party contributed.

Deborah Cochran, who had been a

state representative for four years,

ran for Congress

unsuccessfully and served as vice chairman of the Republican State Committee. In 1983

she entered the employ of Mike Valerio, a

new

right activist

and businessman. Cochran

arranged to have two dozen major business figures, moderate and conservative, pledge a
certain

amount of money

to candidates

on

whom she,

working with the Friday Group,

agreed to concentrate resources. Valerio, to his credit, seldom interfered in decisions on

who received money, even when moderate Republicans were included.
As a result of a Republican city and town committee program we initiated,
at the

town and

treasuries,

committee

city

fund-raising

level contributed dramatically to increased local party

which reached $189,000

in 1984.

Without central direction, these local com-

mittees poured their resources into legislative contests, further increasing our candidates'

campaign funds.

Rebuilding the Party Organization

The

realization of the importance of local organization gradually

became

clear at the

Republican National Committee during the Dick Richards and Frank Fahrenkopf chair-

manships (1981

to 1988).

man (Utah and Nevada,
be convinced
both
tee's

that the

Both

men brought long

service as state and county party chair-

respectively) to the national chairmanship.

They did not have

to

missing element in the Brock program was local party development;

knew it from their own experience. Almost simultaneously with the national commitnew emphasis on organization, we in Massachusetts realized that the major weak-

ness in both the 1980 and 1982 election campaigns was the absence of a coherent local
organizational development program.

The Democratic

Party's theory of organizational development relies on the interest

groups with which the party

AFL-CIO, and
nism

state

to deliver the

is

allied to provide workers.

Thus the teachers'

association,

employee unions provide campaign help, contributions, and a mecha-

message of Democratic candidates. The Republican

contacts voters directly without intermediary interest groups, a

technology-intensive

mechanism than

the Democratic

medium

Party, conversely,

much more

expensive and

of communication. The

was an attempt
remedy our overreliance on technology and underuse of people to win elections.
In 1983 we launched what became known as Project Grassroots. Our effort was entirely
independent of the program the Republican National Committee had initiated, which was

effort to create a Massachusetts Republican grassroots party organization
to

ill

suited to the Massachusetts Republican organization.

in this

area in any case.
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We weren't targeted for any help

If the

Republican Party had held the governorship, creating a new party organization

would have been
as a

list

easier. Volunteers

from the gubernatorial campaigns would have served

of potential party workers, particularly

if

the governor

were closely identified

The patronage power of the governor of a major industrial
Massachusetts would attract volunteers whose enthusiasm would be in direct

with the party in their minds.
state like

proportion to the perception of a public sector position awaiting them after good and
faithful service in the

campaign.

Republican candidates

who had

generated extensive volunteer

We didn't hold

lists to

In a series of pilot mailings in 1983

and none of the

the governor's chair,

whom

lost)

had

and 1984, we asked for money and enclosed a

vol-

stood for statewide office

in

1982

(all

of

draw upon.

unteer card requesting volunteers to work for the Republican candidates on the ballot

in

which the mailing was being done. While the response
volunteer for party service, it was not a popular form of

the particular towns or cities in

card

still

included a place to

work; the candidates received more interest than the party. The results astonished

When the state committee sent a mailing

to all registered

us.

Massachusetts Republicans, one

percent responded with a check, which was the financial break-even point. The mailing

made no profit, except in adding names of new contributors for future
The Project Grassroots mailings produced 5 to 8 percent response rates, with income
five to six times the expense. On average, a thousand-piece mailing costing $200 would
generate fifty individual responses, averaging $20 each, netting $800 for Republican town
committee treasuries. As important as the income produced was the number of volunteer
cards returned with the contributions that indicated a willingness to work for one or more
paid for itself but
use.

of the Republican candidates listed.

Our finance

director, Jack

Zadow, also expert

in grassroots organizing,

developed an

phenomenal response rates of these local mailings. First,
the mailings were signed by a Republican leader. Even if the recipient did not know the
name of the signatory, the title of the person (Chairman, East Podunk Republican Town
Committee) meant a lot more to a potential donor on a letter than my name as the Republiintriguing explanation for the

can State Committee chairman. Anything that made the mailing seem more authentically

When the text of the

local

and

letter

and the response card included the names of specific Republican candidates. Repub-

less professional increased the

response

rate.

lican voters could register their enthusiasm for a particular candidate

solicitation

by volunteering

to

work.
In

all,

140

city

and town committee mailings

in

1984 raised $189,000 for local treasurI0

more than had been raised locally for the previous four elections combined. Five
thousand new volunteers were recruited to party work, many for the U.S. Senate primary
fight between Elliott Richardson and Ray Shamie. Both campaigns used the volunteer
ies,

cards to help staff their telephone banks.

With the money and volunteers

raised,

we embarked on

a second local party program,

the Republican Candidate Directory, for the 1984 campaign.

The directory consisted of

eleven-by-seventeen-inch newspaper-style tabloids, which pictured on the front, with
brief biographies, the president, vice president, and the Republican candidate for U.S.

Ray Shamie. The inside pages featured all the Republican candidates for lower
from state representative to U.S. Congress, in the particular town or city for
which each tabloid was produced. A quarter of the tabloid was devoted to a statement of
the economic philosophy of the party. In all we designed and produced 450.000 of these
tabloids for the seventy communities that agreed to distribute and pay the costs of producSenate,

offices,

ing them.
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The party committee

in each town or city had to be convinced to participate in the direcOnly 50 percent of the 140 towns and cities that participated in the Project
Grassroots mailing also accepted the candidates' directory. The condition of the local
party organization determined whether it was distributed door to door by party workers,
mailed, or inserted in the local newspaper. In the majority of communities it was distributed to all voting households; in other areas it was mailed only to independents and Republicans. We let the local party committee decide its own strategy for targeted voters and
tory.

methods of distribution. By requiring each
printing
that

we

any community would pay for

ceived, so
tees with

it

local

committee

pay for the design and

to

increased the likelihood of its actually being distributed, since

was

it

it

was unlikely

and not make use of it. The project was simply con-

We did not burden local commitWe did not want to

easily explained to local party leaders.

any unreasonable task they would be unable to complete.

frighten local committees unused to this sort of grassroots work.

A sizable proportion of the registered Republican voters in Massachusetts were contacted through four state party

programs

Candidate Directory; a solicitation
publicans, which

letter

in 1984: the city

from the

state

and town mailing program; the

committee

to all registered

Re-

money with an enclosed membership
telephone banks with which we prospected for new donors by

signed as chairman, asking for

I

card; and the state party

calling every Republican household in the state

and asking for $15. These

were

strategies

designed to show the Republican electorate, demoralized by a decade of defeats in Massachusetts, that the Massachusetts

and volunteer help and

GOP, on

way to a comeback, needed their financial
Through these voter programs we hoped

its

their enthusiastic vote.

to

mobilize the Republican electorate to more active participation in the political system, and
in the

process create a resurgent Republican party.

For the 1984 and 1986 elections we created a voter name

file,

registered voters, with street address, zip code, and telephone

a computerized

list

of all

number and demographic

data such as ethnic background and sex, along with the federal census tract and party
registration. All local party

committees and Republican candidates had access

to the

com-

puter system to produce mailing labels for any targeted universe of voters (for example,

Italian-American independent

phone bank

calling

puter file for our

employed

it

lists,

own

women

or walking

voters

financial mailings and

for both the grassroots mailings

who

live in

western Massachusetts),

door-to-door canvassing.

lists for

phone banks, while

tele-

We used the com-

local party

committees

and the distribution of the candidate direc-

The Reagan-Bush and Shamie and Richardson U.S. Senate campaigns had each set
up telephone banks to identify their respective voters and get them out to vote on Election
tory.

Day.

By using our

voter

name

up telephone numbers. The

file,

each campaign avoided the redundant effort of looking

state party

produced the service

the inefficiency of candidate maintenance of the files, and

for every

we decided

campaign
to

to avoid

provide

it

in all

future elections.

The voter name

file

gave the state committee

itself political

power by making candidates

dependent on the committee for these otherwise prohibitively expensive services. The

file

increased the technical capacity of each of our candidate's campaigns to contact voters
quickly and efficiently:
forty-eight hours.

The

we

file

could produce mailing labels for any universe of voters in

was the most important work we did

to facilitate contact be-

tween the party organization, our candidates, and the voting public.

The aftermath of the 1984
building.

election presented us with unique opportunities for party

Reagan-Bush won Massachusetts with 51

better than 1980,

.5

percent of the vote, nearly ten points

Ray Shamie received 45 percent of the vote which, while not close

50

to

winning, was a credible showing, and the party made
1962. Each successful local race, our

best gains in the legislature since

its

local party-building projects,

wide campaigns, successful or not, had generated new volunteers

and the major

who had

state-

never before

participated in a political campaign.

These new workers had

remained high. As previously indicated, the town and

interest

dled in

be quickly integrated into the party structure while their

to

membership from 14,000

1960s to 6,000

in the late

3,000 and 4,000 new workers, most of them under

city

committees had dwin-

in 1980.

years old,

fifty

We

who

counted between
participated in the

1984 election cycle. The Shamie-Richardson primary contest drew 107,000 independent

and former Democrat votes

in a total

Republican primary vote of 270,000. Richardson

showed him beating Shamie, albeit narrowly,
The conservative Ray Shamie received a sizable majority

polling data as of the day before the primary

among

registered Republicans.

voters, most of whom were Roman Catholic, young votWhile these people did not participate as workers, they had voted, perhaps for the

from nontraditional Republican
ers.

first time, in a

ter as

Republican primary, and might

if

asked through a direct mail piece, regis-

Republicans. Party building would be conducted on two levels,

among

the

new

workers and the new voters.

To reach the new voters we first had to organize the new workers. In his victory speech
on primary night, Ray Shamie referred to the new Republican Party upon which his victory was founded. The new party was more conservative, more ethnic, and less WASP
than the traditional party. Elliott Richardson, who had turned a forty-point lead over Sha-

mie

in the polls six

months

almost every respect.

earlier into a twenty-point defeat, represented the old party in

A respected international statesman,

been both lieutenant governor and attorney general before
tary of State in January 1969 by President Nixon.

man in American history,

he was Harvard educated, had
his

appointment as undersecre-

He held more cabinet posts

than any

resigning in the middle of the Watergate scandal rather than

accede to Nixon's demand to fire the Watergate special prosecutor, Archibald Cox.
Richardson, a Brahmin Yankee gentleman, quintessential
a moderate Republican

crushed

in the

man who had

who

WASP of Colonial lineage,

spent virtually his entire career in public service.

primary by a newcomer
run for the U.S. Senate

to politics,

in

was

He was

Ray Shamie, a conservative business-

1982 against Ted Kennedy. Shamie was of Syrian

and French extraction, Roman Catholic upbringing, and Republican by choice, not family
background. Brought up

in a

poor family, he had made millions by his own invention and

entrepreneurial enterprise.

These two men epitomized the organizational conflict
old and

new

party as

we

had emerged as a force

that

was

to

develop between the

tried to graft onto the traditional structure the

in the

elections with turf battles

new workers who

1984 election. Having had much experience

between factions

in the party,

we decided

in

previous

to create a

new

level of

unwelcome new
took over com-

organization rather than force unwilling local party committees to accept

people into their midst. In some areas of the state the new people quietly
mittee leadership with no fight at

all.

In the

more vibrant and

active committees the

new

workers were not only welcomed, they were immediately given responsibility. The more
inactive and useless the committee, the more threatened it was by interlopers who arrived
on the scene with new ideas on organizational development. The fights from these leader-

ship conflicts
that

would have been so contentious and unsettling and the scars so long

we decided

Outside
party

is

New

systematically to avoid

them

if

we

England the fundamental organizational unit

the precinct,

which

is

lasting

could.
at the grassroots level

of the

organized by the county party committee, the intermediate
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organizational entity between the precinct and the state committee. In Massachusetts there

no intermediate party committees, only the town ward and state committees. This
terms that the state committee must deal with 351 city and town party

existed

means

in practical

committees, a managerial nightmare. Forty years ago each county in Massachusetts had a
strong county Republican Club which, while formally chartered by the state committee,

was not

The

mandated.

statutorily

bylaws

state party

still

provide for regional units of organization. In each of the

forty Massachusetts senatorial districts, there

two elected

state

is

supposed

to

be a council made up of the

committee members and the ward, town, and

the communities in the district.

At

city

committee chairmen of

least for the past decade, these senatorial

committees

have been completely inoperative, having diminished in vigor as the towns and wards did.

The regional

units of organization

were central

to the organizational theory of the old

party leadership.

Combining our need

for a regional political unit with the

need

new

to integrate

party

workers into the traditional organization, we formed eleven Republican Congressional
Councils, using Massachusetts 's eleven congressional districts as boundaries.

went around the local stonewallers and created a new organizational

entity to

We simply

which the

new workers could belong. Since it was they for the most part who would form these
councils, we could be sure the exclusionary tendencies of the old party would be minimized. And eleven organizational units are a manageable number for us to deal with
regularly.

The absence of vigorous leadership
cle to

its

renewal.

two strong Republican Party leaders
effects

on election

results for local

and placing strong leaders
ents usefully.

By

in the local party

We noticed that even

in staunchly

at the

and

remained the single major obsta-

Democratic towns and

cities,

one or

head of a town committee could have profound

state offices.

Our problem was

in responsible positions in

finding, training,

which they could employ

their tal-

number of new organizations we could take
latest election campaign and give them a structure in which

creating a relatively small

the strongest leaders

from the

to channel their energies.

Under Massachusetts law no organization could use

names Republican or Democrat
The resistance we thought we
committee when they were presented with
the

except by vote of the state committee of the respective party.

might encounter from the old guard on the
the bylaws and charters of these

were nervous

we

that these councils

new

would increase

presented each charter for approval.

move

state

A few of my adversaries
my power in the party, and grumbled as

councils never materialized.

Rumors

circulated in the networks of the old

reinstating some of the old clubs.
The old guard was itself split between those threatened by our new organizational inventions and those whose desire to win overcame their fear of losing turf. The old guard

party of a

to counteract the councils'

power by

its lethargy to effectively oppose anything we did in organizational innoThose most threatened were coincidentally the least organized and effective. By
1986 we had organized seven congressional councils with 1 ,500 paid members.
Our second organizational innovation was the reform of the party nominating conven-

never rose from
vation.

tions held every four years to endorse a slate of candidates for constitutional office.
state

Democrats, under Dukakis's

rule,

by only Democratic town committees. Their conventions became opportunities
expand the worker base of the Democratic Party, to increase the sense of participation

ticipation
to

The

broadly expanded their conventions beyond par-

in party policy

and ultimately

in

governance.
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In

1982 the Republican State Committee ran a traditional convention using rules for

delegate selection and allocation long accepted by the party organization. All delegates to
the convention

were either chosen by the Republican town and

committees or the

city

formal grassroots party organization or were voting ex-officio delegates (legislators,

congressmen, and county

The number of delegates

officials).

allocated to each local

com-

mittee was based on the vote for president in the 1980 election. After a rather contentious
debate, the state committee, at

my

strong urging, voted to hold a smaller convention

,600 delegates), both because of the space limitations in the location at which

(1

contracted to hold the event and because

While

this

convention

may have been

a

believed

I

would involve

it

model of administrative

we had

less staff time.

efficiency,

build the party organization except cosmetically, lacked credibility to the

it

failed to

news media and

opinion makers, and smacked of bossism and manipulation.

The small
chusetts.
for

size of the convention only

We had

no requirement

underscored the small base of the party

in the rules that a

some period of time before being chosen

the party

was a paper organization or

chines, in concert with

in

Massa-

person be registered as a Republican

as a delegate. In the older

totally nonexistent, the

one of our Republican candidates

urban areas where

Democratic

political

ma-

for governor, organized the local

who had recently registered as Republicans, but
showed no genuine change of party allegiance, as members. These new committee mem-

party committees with Democrats

bers elected themselves delegates to the Republican convention.

Under our

rules a party

committee could be formed where none had existed by a simple meeting of interested
"Republicans" and a petition sent

to the state

committee

stating their interest in being

designated an official committee, which would then be automatically approved. Using
this technique,

Democratic Mayor Kevin White controlled much of the Boston Republican

delegation to the 1982 state convention. This packing of the convention gave credibility to

who questioned whether the convention was representative
who ultimately received the party's nomination in the primary,

those defeated candidates
the party. John Sears,

not even bother having his

no

name placed

legal requirement that a candidate

in

nomination

compete

at the

and inactive ones, which, while
all

fulfilling the legal

did

convention. Since there was

convention, he simply avoided

altogether. Finally, nothing in the rules distinguished

pable of doing any work at

at the

of

it

between active working committees

requirement for existence, were inca-

and sometimes discouraged party

activity

by Republicans

not on the committee, as a threat to their turf.

The convention

rules needed reform. In 1985, preparing for the 1986 convention to

nominate candidates for statewide office
eral, secretary

— governor, lieutenant governor, attorney gen— we drafted a set of reforms designed to

of state, treasurer, and auditor

cure what had ailed the convention four years

earlier.

Our original

draft proposed several

important changes:

•

An

increase in the size of the convention from

to indicate a

•

1

,600 to 3,000 delegates

wider base of party support.

Three bonus delegates

to

reward those local committees which per-

formed seven tasks we thought important. (Did the committee
1985 raise and spend
the

money

House or Senate on

each household,

start a

in

1984 or

for candidate support, have a candidate for

the ballot, distribute the candidate's literature to

Young Republican Club,
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official to switch parties,

have

committee membership, or hold a

full

political event?)

The

election of 40 percent of the delegates at forty regional caucuses at

which any registered Republican could vote or run

for delegate, with

50

percent of the delegates allocated on the basis of the presidential vote plus

any bonus delegates to be selected using the traditional delegate selection

method

— Republican town and ward committees.

Automatic delegate

status for elected

Republican officeholders,

committee members (both traditional categories), and any

state

officially

chartered Republican organizations. (We had created two dozen in the

previous five years.)

No exclusionary

rule requiring, as the

Democrats

did, a candidate for

any statewide office to receive 15 percent or more of the delegate vote to

be allowed access

to the

Republican primary

Listing the winners of the convention first
the office they

were running

for

ballot.

on the primary

ballot

under

and noting "endorsed by the Republican

State Convention."

•

Making

it

pack inactive or nonexistent committees

virtually impossible to

by moving up the date by which they had

These reforms were designed

to

members

to greater participation

by party

of Republican town and city commit-

reward activity by local committees with bonus delegates; make the convention a

main media event with enough

credibility

endorsement would be a major benefit
that all candidates

tion

be organized.

open the convention

workers, candidates, and donors, not only
tees;

to

endemic

would participate

its

size

and breadth of representation

in the convention);

to previous conventions;

tionalize the reforms as a

by

that

its

to a candidate (thereby increasing the likelihood

and do

permanent change

tions in the future. This latter condition

all this in

in

reduce the bossism and manipulasuch a way that

we could institu-

our organization and conduct of conven-

meant widely publicizing

the changes, holding a

public hearing, encouraging party debate about them, putting on the drafting committee

some opponents of the reforms, and genuinely allowing
our

initial

the Rules

Committee

to

modify

proposal and winning the reforms on the floor of the state committee by a deci-

sive margin.

The

local party organizations, outraged

by the dilution of their power

implicit in these reforms, protested at sporadic meetings they held

committees the

first in

years

least temporarily, inactive

cal turf. In

at the

convention

— for some moribund

— across the state. If nothing else, the plan resuscitated, at

and paper committees anxious

to protect their threatened politi-

my announcement of the plan I attacked the useless

committees, hoping that

seemed to work perhaps open criticism might force some activity. Negative incentives do work sometimes. While every local party official was initially upset by
the rumors of what was included in the plan, the most inactive or useless committees were
those which screamed the loudest. A complete explanation of the reforms satisfied all the
since nothing else
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active committees, particularly

when

rewarded by the incentive system

The

final plan

they realized that they would be recognized and

good work.

for their

proposed by the Rules Committee and approved by the

committee,

state

while containing the major points of my original plan, was different enough that

smack of a rubber stamp. Adopted unanimously by
most factions of the

the state committee,

party, increasing the likelihood that

future conventions. (In fact,

Ray Shamie's 1990

1986 reforms and broadly expanded the

state

it

it

did not

was accepted by

would be part of

its initiatives

convention rules contained

number of open-caucus-selected

the

all

delegates.)

One

contentious change was the 15 percent rule, which requires a candidate to obtain at least
that percentage

of the convention vote to appear on the primary ballot. The Rules

Com-

mittee proposed, and the state committee adopted, a 10 percent rule, which while less
restrictive than the

Democrats' 15 percent

rule, nevertheless

image from which the Republican Party had suffered

emphasized the exclusionary

many

for

years.

The Democratic

Party in Massachusetts held enough political capital with the electorate that
to look exclusionary at its

opposed the

convention without damage

at the polls.

it

could afford

We could not,

so

I

rule.

When the Democrats had adopted their

15 percent convention rule in 1982,

it

promptly challenged by several Democratic candidates for lieutenant governor

was

who were

denied access to the primary ballot because they did not meet the requirement. Massachusetts election

law explicitly permitted anyone, properly registered and having obtained the

number of signatures on nomination papers, a place on the primary ballot. Court
decisions in other states had for a decade been moving toward the deregulation of the
political parties, giving them greater authority over the conduct of their internal affairs.
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held, in a landmark decision which astonished
requisite

both political activists and the legal community, that in spite of state law providing

full

access to the primary ballot, political parties could within limits restrict that access even
for those candidates

who met all

the legal requirements.

The

15 percent rule

was thus

upheld by the courts.

The

effect of both the

same. By requiring a

Democratic 15 percent and Republican 10 percent rules was the

minimum convention

wide office would have

their

names placed

vote, both
in

ensured that

nomination

all

candidates for state-

at the convention,

making a

serious effort at appealing to delegates for their support. These rules clearly enhanced the

power of the convention and
stricted ballot access.

what

the formal party organization over

it

had with unre-

A second effect was to concentrate attention in the primary on

fewer candidates. Fringe or weak candidates

who might distort the primary

vote would be

excluded from consideration.

Primary debates with fewer candidates would mean
discuss his or her views and the media
the views.

The

that

each would have more time to

more space per candidate

for in-depth analysis of

rules increased the likelihood that a candidate could obtain the primary

nomination with a majority rather than plurality vote, and therefore the possibility that the

nominated candidate was truly representative of the respective

was good

The

for the party

party.

Our

10 percent rule

and organization, but bad for our image.

number of votes the
on Election Day. While intermediate goals such as party registration, the number of candidates who run for office, advances in fund-raising, campaign
services, issue research, and image building may improve prospects for long-term success
ultimate measure of success for political parties remains the

party nominees receive
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booth, they don't assure it. Such other factors as national policy and economic conditions, the perceived ability of the party to govern if its candidates are elected,
the number of incumbent officeholders retiring, the relative personal strengths of the
at the voting

nominees of both parties matched against each
the result. State party organizations have

other,

little if

and chance historical events affect

any control over these factors, but they

can be decisive in the volatile climate of a political campaign.

Based on the
suggest

some

results of the four election cycles

(1980-1986) covered by

this article, I

speculative conclusions about the Republican Party's efforts at party re-

newal, the weaknesses of the Brock model for party renewal, and the prospects for the
party in 1990 in Massachusetts.

Measured by intermediate

goals, the renewal

program was a great

income

success: the

of the state party increased 450 percent, campaign services and technology that were
nonexistent in the state before 1980 were developed and targeted to legislative races, and
the

number of, and mechanisms

for participation by, party

this party

party

renewal effort

made

workers increased. Measured

— the central focus of
— the effort was a more modest success. In legislative races the

by the ultimate goals of electing more Republicans

to the legislature

the following net gains or losses: gained

1980 (30 House and 7 Senate),

lost

one House

one House and one Senate

and remained the same

seat

1982 (29 House and 7 Senate), gained five House and one Senate seat

Senate in

1984 (34 House

one House seat and remained the same in the Senate in 1986 (33
Over these four election cycles the party gained six seats in the ledelegation, a 17 percent increase. The legislative gains in 1984 were the largest

and 8 Senate), and

House and 8
gislative

in

seat in

in the

lost

Senate).

since 1962 in absolute numbers, the party having lost seats fairly steadily in each election
since the mid-1960s.

The most

striking aspects of these four election cycles

is

the disparity between the dra-

matic increase in Republican resources measured in money, workers, and campaign
services,

in the number of legislative seats.
more resources did not translate into substantially more seats. The gains in
seats were made in 1980 and 1984, when Ronald Reagan headed the Republi-

and the modest improvement (17 percent)

Substantially
legislative

can ticket and the Democratic presidential ticket was particularly weak. In both 1980 and

1984 Reagan carried Massachusetts, however narrowly, for the

first

time for a Republican

presidential candidate since 1956.

Republican legislative gains

same

time: the

made by
Table

1

Reagan

in

coattails

1984 may be attributable

to

two factors working

at the

and the campaign services and financial contributions

the state party in targeted races. Either one alone

shows the number of races

that

would have been

Republican House candidates

votes over five elections cycles, the increase in the

number of House

lost

insufficient.

by under

seats, the

1

,500

percentage

of vote of the Republican candidate at the top of the ticket (gubernatorial or presidential),

and average campaign contributions. 11

The

data in Table

1

moved narrow
number of races Republican candidates lost by under

suggests that the party campaign service programs

races to victorious ones, since the

1,500 votes declined from fourteen in 1978, a year in which Frank Hatch received 47
percent of the vote for governor, to eight in 1980 and four in 1984. All the races targeted

from 1982 onward turned out to include the races won or lost narrowly.
Bush winning 46 percent of the vote in Massachusetts, the Republican
Party saw a net decline of one seat in the House while the Senate remained the same. Shamie dramatically increased state party funding to $1 .5 million in 1988 from our high point
of $910,000 in 1986, but he did not regard campaign services and direct contributions to

by the

state party

In 1988, with
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Table J
Republican
No. of

GOP House

Presidential/

Candidates Losing
by Less Than
1,500 Votes

Year

1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986

Gubernatorial

GOP

-2

11

+1
-1

+5
-1

2

*John Anderson took 15% of the Massachusetts

**The Friday Group was responsible

for

Targeted Seats*

42%
47%
42%*
38%
51%
30%

-1

14
8
4
4

Contribution of
State Party to

Percentage in
Massachusetts

Net Gain or
Loss in House

vote,

$3,000-$4,000

$ 500
$1,000
$1,500
$2,000
$3,500**
$7,800**

though Reagan carried the state narrowly.
additional

in

campaign contributions per

targeted candidate.

candidates as the central

work of the committee. He

instead concentrated on party organi-

zational development.

My own view is that the Republican voter base in the state remains too small
any dramatic improvement
tion of

new

in the legislative or

to

make

congressional delegation without the addi-

voter blocs that are not part of the National Republican Presidential Coalition.

In fact, in the last four presidential races, the Republican

nominee consistently received 8

percent fewer votes in Massachusetts than nationally, as shown in Table 2.

The Republican

presidential coalition vote

the country as a whole.
to

become competitive

setts party to

The party must
in statewide

and

is

8 percent smaller in Massachusetts than in

increase

its

base 8 to 10 percent in Massachusetts

legislative races. This will require the

Massachu-

look and think differently from the Republican National Party. This does not

mean returning to the age of liberal Republicanism or adopting the Dukakis agenda of
New Age liberalism.
It does mean designing a new party platform on top of, not in place of, the national
platform, which appeals to specific identified voter groups that presently float between
the parties in varying degrees without alienating the existing base.

ogy of the Republican
images that may

state party will certainly

attract these

new

be helpful

The

political technol-

in delivering the

message and

voter groups. But in this case the technology

no more than a medium

is

not the

communicate a carefully crafted message. Political technology has its limit, and the Massachusetts party has reached it. The fascination
with high-tech campaigns, expensive political technology, direct mail and telephone
banks which we fostered in the state party by adopting the Brock model of party renewal
has obscured the weakness in the party's base of support. Well-financed and well-run
message;

it

is

to

Table 2
Percentage of
Two-Party Vote,
Massachusetts

Percentage of
Two-Party Vote,
Nationally

Ford

1976

42

51

Reagan

1980

42

50

Reagan

1984

51

59

Bush

1988

46

54
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campaigns with appealing candidates are a necessary but insufficient condition
tion success in Massachusetts: an

expanded platform

extending beyond the national party agenda

is

skillfully

communicated

for elec-

to voters

the missing element.

Party workers have long argued that the state party has failed to articulate the national

party agenda of economic conservatism and that this failure
failure to achieve majority status.

March 1986

in

is

responsible for the party's

A poll conducted by Arthur Finkelstein and Associates

for the state party indicated that the Massachusetts electorate believed

Republicans were more likely to cut taxes than the Democrats by a 44 percent to 30 percent margin, and to impose the death penalty (Republicans
less likely to support

43%, Democrats 18%) and
16% Republicans). The

giveaway programs (49% Democrats vs.

voters do understand the Republican message;

it

simply

not enough to attract sufficient

is

of their votes to win.

During 1980-1986 the
tional

state party

engaged

in a

number of programs

to present the tradi-

Republican message to Massachusetts voters. In 1986 we ran a $30,000

tional radio advertising

campaign

to

improve the image of the

party, using

institu-

orthodox

Republican themes. In 1981 and 1983-1984, we instituted the legislative reform
petition;

and

in

1985-1986, with Citizens for Limited Taxation, we

initiated the

initiative

income

We

surtax repeal petition to recover the party's lost reputation for government reform.

created a shadow cabinet parallel to the Dukakis cabinet to publicize Republican re-

sponses to the Democratic agenda. The Republican caucus in the legislature filed a pack-

age of bills each year for a decade of innovation in state government policy, but

guided by orthodox Republican ideology. The party

in the legislature

and the

all

were

com-

state

mittee relentlessly attacked Dukakis and his Democratic troops for high taxes, overregulation, bureaucratic excesses,

runaway spending, and

Republicans accurately anticipated the current fiscal

liberal social policy.
crisis

While the

of the state in their decade-

long attack on Dukakis, prophetic success has not improved the party's standing

among

the voters according to a poll taken by the state party in the spring of 1989.

Two

and taxes, have traditionally dominated state politics in MassaWhether deserved or not, Massachusetts had a reputation as one of the most
"squalid, corrupt and despicable" political systems of the fifty states, as Theodore H.
White once wrote. The term "Taxachusetts" arose from public perception of extraordinarily high taxes in Massachusetts. Michael Dukakis capitalized on the tax issue to win
issues, corruption

chusetts.

i:

the 1974 gubernatorial election
to balance the state budget.

was

integrity in

when he gave a

lead-pipe guarantee not to raise state taxes

His subtheme in that same campaign, as well as the 1982 race,

government. Dukakis's popularity

in

Massachusetts and

its

subsequent

collapse after his defeat for president in 1988 are attributable to his reputation for per-

sonal integrity (a characteristic that the public perceives absent in the political system

generally in Massachusetts) and his voter-perceived loss of integrity following that
election.

common

refrain heard

kakis, or a variation thereof,

had been "At

Perhaps the most

from voters
least

he

is

in

Massachusetts about Mike Du-

honest.

Even

him, you have to respect his honesty." During his years in public

if

life

you don't agree with

Dukakis has assidu-

ously cultivated this image of a Puritan in Babylon. His reputation for integrity and a

booming
70

to

state

economy with

a state treasury overflowing with tax revenue produced his

80 percent approval ratings and his 70 percent

total vote in

November

1986.

The

1988 campaign for president brought out dramatically and colorfully damaging information about Dukakis's ten years as governor.

But more damaging than any campaign

advertising was the precipitous decline of the state
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economy and consequently

state tax

revenues and the seemingly uncontrolled rise

mous annual

in the

budget deficit caused both by enor-

increases in the state budget during the preceding five years and falling

revenues. Instead of accepting and dealing with the facts, Dukakis denied them

statement after another. In the

exploded, making

about

it

months following

in

one

the 1988 election, the budget difficulties

apparent to the voting public that Dukakis had been less than candid

the state's fiscal condition.

The governor's disingenuous behavior and perceived

failure to lead collapsed his public approval ratings

United States to the lowest (one poll had him

at a 13

from the highest of any governor

in modern American political history).
The work of the Massachusetts Democrats will certainly be made much

in the

may

percent approval rating, which

be the lowest for any governor
chusetts Republicans

fail to

take advantage of their opponents' weakness.

future of the Democratic coalition with the departure of
nities to the

Massa-

Mike Dukakis presents opportu-

Republican Party to attract formerly Democratic voter blocs to their own

coalition. Ultimately

groups

easier if

The uncertain

to the party.

it

must be the Republican standard-bearer who

attracts

new

voter

A good argument could be made that the Reagan coalition did not take

conscious form until after the 1980 election. Voters did not cast their ballots to elect
to remove Jimmy Carter from that posiOnce in office, Reagan masterfully constructed a coalition that did reelect him and
program in 1984. Similarly, Massachusetts Republicans may need to win the gover-

Ronald Reagan president as strongly as they did
tion.

his

norship on the basis of William Weld's strengths and John Silber's weaknesses, and once
in office consciously construct a
is

that

it

may

more

coalition with a distinct set of issues to attract
Silber's

The point

positive and lasting statewide coalition.

not be necessary for the Republicans to define and form a gubernatorial

weaknesses as a candidate:

new

voter groups if they can fully exploit

his abrasiveness, his alliance with the old

Democratic

Party of Kevin Harrington, William Bulger, and Kevin White, and his liberal fiscal policies designed to appeal to the construction

groups

that rely

on

state

government

and public employee unions and the

interest

largess.

Perhaps our greatest strategic failure during the seven years

I

served as chairman of the

Massachusetts Republican Party was concentrating on legislative races to the exclusion of

The top of the ticket usually has a profound effect on the outcome for
The great difficulty for the party in 1990 is that the coalition behind Bill Weld is different from the local aggregation of voter blocs Republican candidates
for the legislature will attract. The top of the ticket may not provide the coattails needed to
statewide ones.

legislative candidates.

significantly

improve Republican representation

in the legislature.

Should Massachusetts Republicans lose the governorship

in

1990 and

fail to

increase

numbers in the legislature, will the necessary conclusion be that party renewal is
impossible? Given the sorry condition of state government and voter anger with incumbents, it would seem the Democrats would be in trouble and the Republicans would be the
natural beneficiary of the situation. Perhaps the greatest opportunity the 1990 Democratic
their

primary results present

to the

Republican Party

Dukakis voters will never support John
Dukakis

Silber,

will not mobilize the electorate for

is

the collapse of the Dukakis coalition.

and the new party organization

John

built

by

Silber. Party loyalty is nevertheless a

powerful magnate to keep parts of the Democratic coalition in place. Republicans are

outnumbered by the Democrats and

will

make demonstrable progress

1990 elections under these circumstances,

long time before

it

many

still

If the party doesn't
it

will

be a

has this same opportunity again.

Victory in an election
factors,

in the

be for the foreseeable future.

is

forged from an imprecise and unpredictable combination of

of which sometimes have

little

to
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do with the inherent strengths or weak-
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nesses of political parties.
tory and a

weak candidate

An extraordinary

candidate can raise a minority party to vic-

take a majority party to defeat.

historical event such as the Iran hostage crisis can

A Watergate scandal or chance

dominate a campaign

in a

way

that

ignores the relative position of the parties. Winning or losing a single election does not

always indicate the real appeal of a political party

— only long-term trends can do that. If

the Republican Party wins the governorship in 1990

platform from which to build a

however, will not

tion,

it

will have an

more competitive party

itself suffice to

enormously powerful

for the 1990s.

Winning one

elec-

rebuild the Republican Party.
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